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Maier: Outgrowing the Commerce Clause

COMMENT
OUTGROWING THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE:
FINDING ENDANGERED SPECIES A
HOME IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
The one process now going on that will take millions of years to
correct is the loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of
natural habitats. This is the folly our descendants are least likely to
forgive us.

E.O. Wilson!

INTRODUCTION

The impacts of species extinction are immense and irreversible.
Species that were once found throughout the nation in abundant
populations find themselves fighting for survival. They are contained in
small populations in even smaller geographical ranges, often located
wholly within the borders of one state. 2 About half of the species
included on the federal endangered species list are "intrastate" species,

121 (1984).
See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbit, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("NAHB") (Approximately 521 of the 1082 species in the United States currently designated as
threatened or endangered are found in only one state).
I

EDWARD WILSON, BIOPHILlA,

2
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experiencing all stages of their life cycle within a single state. 3 While
protections for these species exist within the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), recent events indicate the protections for intrastate species
might be weakened, or completely eliminated in the near future. 4
6
In 1973, Congress passed the ESA5 under the Commerce Clause.
Although the Supreme Court has not reviewed the constitutionality of the
ESA,7 some believe that it is in danger of future attacks. 8 Precedent set
within the last decade limits the scope of the Commerce Clause. 9
Additionally, several circuit courts agree about the strong constitutional
status of the ESA, but remain divided in their reasoning. \0 This fractured
jurisprudence remains a problem, creating instability for the ESA if the
constitutionality of the ESA ever reaches the Supreme Court, where the
new additions of Justices Roberts and Alito are certain to impact the
Court's analysis." Whereas some ESA proponents believe that the
Supreme Court's recent expansion of Commerce Clause authority over
the regulation of intrastate goods will impact the ESA's application
positively,12 this Comment proposes that judicial activism will ultimately
determine the outcome of the ESA controversy. 13
This Comment examines the controversial relationship between the
ESA and the Commerce Clause. Part I provides an overview of the
3/d.

See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544 (1973).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3 (the "Commerce Clause").
7 The Commerce Clause jurisprudence is a mix of both facial challenges and "as applied"
challenges to the regulation of certain activities under the ESA. While this is an important
distinction in the law, the scope of this article only examines an "as applied" challenge to the ESA's
constitutionality, whereby if found against the Act, would only be found unconstitutional as applied
to the challenger's activity and not facially invalidated as a body of law.
8 See Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the
Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits over Whether the Regulated Activity is Private
Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 924-25
(2004); see also Michael C. Blumm and George Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Toads, Wolves, and the
Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act's Take Provision, 34 ENVTL. L. 309, 326-327
(2004); see also David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: The
Rehnquist Court's Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 789, 789 (2005);
see also Jud Matthews, Turning the Endangered Species Act Inside Out?, 113 YALE L.1. 947, 954
(2004).
9 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (holding that the possession of a gun in a school
zone is not economic activity and does not substantially affect interstate commerce); U.S. v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,610 (2000) (interpreting the "noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct"
to be central to the holding in Lopez").
10 Matthews, supra note 8.
II See infra notes 202-213 and accompanying text.
12 Blumm, supra note 8, at 493.
13 See infra notes 193-20 I and accompanying text.
4
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Commerce Clause and the ESA.14 Part II reviews the evolution of the
Commerce Clause and examines, in its current form, the Constitution's
capacity to support the ESA. 15 Part III examines the likelihood of
Supreme Court review of the ESA due to conflicting circuit court
opinions and recent changes in the Supreme Court composition. 16 Part
IV identifies several factors that endanger the ESA at the Supreme Court
level. 17 The Comment concludes that, despite several seemingly
favorable factors, the Commerce Clause framework is still inadequate to
support the ESA, which remains in danger of a constitutional attack at
the Supreme Court level. Though our current constitutional framework
leaves the ESA vulnerable to attack, the ESA should not suffer as a result
of our court system's shortcomings. Therefore, Part V proposes
solutions to this inadequacy, including a shared responsibility between
state and federal entltles, several legislative remedies, and a
recommendation for the Supreme Court to adopt the Fifth Circuit's
rationale. 18 Within these solutions, the Comment ultimately favors the
comprehensive scheme rationale as applied to the ESA. Though not
perfect in all respects, it is the solution that would allow for the broadest
protection for all endangered species, and is therefore the most desirable
among those in the environmental community.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

In its simplest application, the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to make laws regulating interstate commerce. 19 Environmental
laws were originally passed under the Commerce Clause because the
environment was viewed primarily as a commodity to be regulated?O
More recent environmental laws like the ESA protect species even

See infra notes 19-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 10 1-179 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 180-189 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 190-213 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 214-283 and accompanying text.
19 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to regulate "[clommerce ... among the
several States").
20 See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmelltal
Regulation. 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 404 (2005) (stating that, " ... when the various environmental
statutes were adopted, the underlying assumption was that the Commerce Clause 'grants virtually
carte blanche authority to Congress to legislate for environmental protection''').
14
15
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though they lack significant commercial value. 21 Though views of the
environment have changed, the Commerce Clause remains the primary
avenue to pass laws both to exploit and preserve the environment.
The Supreme Court decisions that define the scope of the
Commerce Clause represent three distinct eras. 22 Over time, the
composition of the Supreme Court has affected the scope of the
Commerce Clause, first expanding it, then constricting it, then expanding
it again. This pattern of giving and taking power away from Congress is
the product of changing times and changing Courts. Throughout these
changes, the line of jurisprudence remains intact, the Court rarely
overruling precedent. Therefore the current analytical framework that
the Roberts Court is faced with constitutes both a compromise of
authority and a contradiction of opinions.
A 1941 Supreme Court case involving a farmer's intrastate
production of wheat, Wickard v. Filburn,23 represents the high-water
mark in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court
determined that in deciding whether an activity substantially affected
interstate commerce, intrastate economic activity could be viewed in the
aggregate. 24 This is known as Wickard's "aggregate effects test"
whereby the judiciary can analyze the cumulative effects of otherwise de
minimus economic activities to ascertain whether, when aggregated,
these activities exert a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 25 Those
who wish to expand the Commerce Clause's power to regulate certain
activity rely heavily on Wickard. 26
Two other cases narrow the scope of the Commerce Clause by
developing a three-prong analysis that centers on an activity's connection
to interstate commerce. 27 In addressing the constitutionality of the Gun
Free School Zones Act,28 the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Lopez identified
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power. 29 Congress can regulate the use of channels of
Mank, supra note 8, at 924·925.
The historical eras of Commerce Clause jurisprudence are often represented
chronologically: cases before 1937, cases from 1937-1995, and cases after 1995. These eras
coincide with landmark Supreme Court cases. ERWIN CHEMERlNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES. 238-268 (2d ed. 2002).
23 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1942).
24 Id . at 127-128.
25 Id.; Mank, supra note 8, at 946.
26 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005) ("Our decision in Wickard is of particular
relevance").
27 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559
28 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990) (Gun Free School Zones Act of \990).
29 Lopez 514 U.S. at 558-559.
21

22
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interstate commerce; Congress can regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of commerce; and Congress can regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 30 Lopez interpreted
this last power to include those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. 31 Later in U.S. v. Morrison, the Court addressed a
facial attack on the Violence Against Women Ace 2 that provided a civil
remedy for victims of gender motivated crimes. 33 In both cases, the
Supreme Court held that the challenged laws dealt with non-economic
activities that should be regulated by the states, as they traditionally have
been. 34
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided a case based largely on
Wickard's large grant of power. 35 Gonzales v. Raich made a bold return
to Wickard's principles by aggregating the effects of home-grown,
intrastate medical marijuana for the purpose of proving a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 36 In applying Wickard to Raich, the Court
concluded that there were striking factual similarities between the two. 3?
The Supreme Court determined that, as in Wickard, "leaving homeconsumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price
and market conditions.,,38 As the Supreme Court held in Wickard, the
Raich Court found that the aggregate effect of not regulating intrastate
marijuana would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by
rendering the comprehensive scheme of the Controlled Substances Ace 9
("CSA") ineffective. 40
In describing the applicability of the
comprehensive scheme rationale to the CSA, the majority concluded that
the CSA is an economic regulatory scheme, and regulating intrastate
marijuana is an essential part of that scheme. 41
Raich applied the economic requirement, using Lopez and Morrison
as guidelines, but eventually distinguished those cases from the CSA on
the basis of what constituted "economic activity.,,42 The Supreme Court
1d.
1d.
32 42 U.S.c. § 13981 (Violence Against Women Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
33 /d. at 602.
34 Id. at 615-616; Lopez. 514 U.S. at 560.
35 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209.
36/d. at 2209, 2211 (using Wickard's aggregation principles in addition to using Lopez and
Morrison's narrow definition of "economic").
37 Id. at 2206-2207.
38 1d.
30

31

21 U.S.C. § 841. et. seq. (Controlled Substances Act).
Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209,2215.
41 Id. at 2208-2209.
42/d. at 221 \.
39

40
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in Raich cautioned that Lopez and Morrison cannot be read too broadly.43
Many argue it is in this way that Lopez and Morrison left the Commerce
Clause blurred in distinctions based on undefined terms and ambiguous
language. 44
The ambiguous Commerce Clause framework of Lopez and
Morrison has plagued intrastate wetland protection as well. Until 2001,
intrastate wetlands protections were strong; then, Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers ("SW ANCC")
signaled a changing trend in intrastate protections and may signal what
could be the beginning of the Supreme Court's movement towards
limiting the protections of environmentallaws. 46 Since there are many
parallels between intrastate wetlands and intrastate species protections,
many view the Supreme Court decision to strip intrastate wetlands from
federal protection as a relevant indicator of the future of the ESA. 47 The
SWANCC Court did not extend Clean Water Act jurisdiction to wetlands
that did not have a hydrological connection and were not adjacent to a
navigable waterway.48 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated in dicta that because migratory birds utilize isolated wetlands, this
does not bring those wetlands into the realm of affecting interstate
commerce. 49
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on three cases
involving intrastate wetlands. 50 U.S. v. Rapanos and Carabell v. U.S.
Anny Corps of Engineers involve statutory jurisdiction issues similar to
SWANCC, and when decided, will be relevant indicators of how the ESA
might be treated in the Supreme Court. 51 In both cases, landowners
sought to discharge fill material into intrastate wetlands and challenged
the Corps' statutory authority to regulate those parcels under the Clean

[d. at 2209.
See Blumm. supra note 8, at 493.
45 See Mank, supra note 8, at 958-959 (stating that the dicta in SWANCC mirrors the
federalism concerns expressed in Lopez and Morrison).
46 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
47 See Mank, supra note 8, at 958-959 (stating that the dicta in SWANCC mirrors the
federalism concerns expressed in Lopez and Morrison).
48 SWANCC. 531 U.S. at 174.
49 [d. at 173.
50 Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), eert. granted, 126
S.Ct. 414 (Oct. 11,2005) (No. 04-1384); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004),
eert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 414 (Oct. 11,2005) (No. 04-1034); S.D. Warren County v. Bd. of Envtl.
Prot., 868 A. 2d 210 (2005), een. granted, 126 S.Ct. 414 (2005) (No. 04-1527).
51 Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 634-635; Carabell, 391 F.3d at 707; S.D. Warren County v. Bd. of
Envtl. Prot., 868 A.2d at 214-217 (involving a Clean Water Act Section 40 I state certification, not a
jurisdictional case).
43

44
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Water Act ("CWA,,).52 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in each case, affirmed the lower court's decisions, applying SWANCC in
favor of the government. 53 Appeals to both were granted certiorari on
October 11, 2005. 54 The outcome of those cases could either reaffirm
SWANCC's application of the Commerce Clause to intrastate entities, or
it could pave a new direction in intrastate wetlands protection, further
threatening the ESA.
B.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES

ACT

The ESA is arguably the most aggressive environmental law of its
time. 55 Critics of the ESA focus on the statute's expansive nature and
unsympathetic view towards property owners and developers. 56 For
example, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, ("TV A"), a large dam
project was halted after it was 70-80% complete because of the existence
of the small, endangered fish, the snail darter. 57 The district court found
that "some $53 million would be lost in non-recoverable obligations.,,58
Despite the cost, the Court refused to put a price tag on the existence of
the snail darter, or on any other endangered species, no matter how
important or unimportant it may appear to be.
The powerful nature of the ESA has also made it an appropriate
target for recent attempts to weaken its provisions. 59 In September of
2005, Congressman Richard Pombo of California introduced a bill in the
House of Representatives that would substantially weaken the ESA's
critical habitat provision, and offer a generous compensation scheme to
land owners who find themselves "victims" of the ESA. 60 So while the
ESA remains a powerful protection, one might wonder if changing times

Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 632-633, 635-644; Carabello 391 F.3d at 705-708.
Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 648; Carabello 391 F.3d at 710.
54 See supra note 50.
55 See e.g .. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) ("T.V.A.") (halting a dam
construction project to preserve the habitat of the snail darter, a small fish).
56 See John T. Winemiller, The Endangered Species Act and the Imprecise Scope of the
Substantial Effects Analysis, 18 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 159,198 (2004).
57 TVA, 437 U.S. at 195.
58 Id. at 166.
59 "Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005", H.R. 3824, I09th Congo
(2005).
60 /d.; See generally Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Policy in Congress: From Consensus
to Gridlock. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 4th ed. 136 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds.,
Congressional Quarterly 2000). (In 1995, California Rep. Pombo and Alaska Rep. Young
introduced a Bill that would have weakened the ESA's provisions by considering the special
interests of property owners and the economic impacts that the ESA has on landowners and
developers. The 104th Congress never approved a final bill.) Id.
52
53
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are creating new opportunities for the Act's adversaries.
Most of the ESA litigation discussed in this Comment focuses on
the constitutionality of Section 9, as applied to intrastate species. 6l
Section 9 of the ESA protects critical habitats against modification or
destruction by preventing the "taking" of a listed species. 62 Therefore,
Section 9 of the ESA is often referred to as the "take" provision. To
"take" a species, by statutory definition, is "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.,,63 Additionally, the majority of the ESA cases discussed
in this Comment are circuit court cases. 64 While the Supreme Court has
never decided the constitutionality of the "take provision" as applied to
intrastate species, the ESA has withstood several constitutional
challenges at the circuit court level. 65 Each circuit's analysis hinges on
different rationales, which has resulted in splintered reasoning among the
circuits. 66
For example, in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbit67
("NAHB"), the D.C. Circuit held that Congress could regulate the taking
of an intrastate species under the Commerce Clause based on four
different rationales in the main opinion alone. 68 At the time, the Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly was located only in California, after urban
development, trash dumping and off-road vehicle use eliminated over 97
percent of its historic habitat. 69 The proposed development project
would have taken a portion of the fly's remaining habitat, contrary to the
ESA's prohibitions. 70 The developer brought a constitutional challenge
and the district court ultimately held that the application of the ESA's
"take" provision to the fly was constitutional. 7l
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, focusing on the "substantial effects"
prong of Lopez. 72 It found under Wickard's aggregation principle, the
taking of the fly viewed in the aggregate of all other intrastate
endangered species takes, would substantially affect interstate
61

16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973).

62

[d.

63 /d.
64

at § 1532.

See infra notes 67-99 and accompanying text.

65/d.
66 See Adler, supra note 20, at 406; see also 8lumm, supra note 8, at 327; see also Scopp,
supra note 8, at 803-810; see also Winemiller, supra note 56, at 179-187.
67 NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041.
68 [d. at 1057.
69 [d. at 1044.
70 [d. at 1044-1045.
71 [d. at 1045.

72

[d. at 1049-1057.
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commerce. 73 The court based this finding on the "option value" of
biodiversity, i.e., that species might hold some undiscovered potential
medicinal or scientific value. 74
Three years later, a case emerged from the Fourth Circuit, the
outcome of which was the same as NAHB, but was based on the direct
economic nature of the species rather than a reliance on biodiversity.75
Gibbs v. Babbitt ("Gibbs") involved the taking of the red wolf.76 Like
NAHB, the Gibbs court focused on Lopez's substantial-effects prong. 77
Since Lopez identifies this prong as requiring some sort of economic
endeavor in order to be fulfilled,78 the Gibbs court asked "whether the
taking of red wolves on private land is in any sense of the phrase
economic activity," and answered in the affirmative. 79
According to Gibbs, the judiciary must take a broad view of
economic activity or commerce. 80 Gibbs found that the taking of the
wolves was economic for two main reasons. First, the protection of
economic and commercial assets was the primary motivation for taking
the wolves. 8! Second, a direct relationship exists between wolves and
commerce: "[ w lith no red wolves, there would be no-red-wolf related
tourism, no scientific research, and no commercial trade in pelts.,,82
Wolves are "incubators for commerce in the same way that parks and
public waters generate commercial activity related to their study and
enjoyment.,,83 The court produced statistics about red-wolf-related
tourism, claiming that it is an industry projected to generate millions of
dollars and "result in a significant regional economic impact.,,84 After
deeming the takings as sufficiently economic, the court then aggregated
their effects and found that the takings substantially affected interstate
commerce. 85
The Gibbs court also briefly introduced the concept of a regulatory
scheme, holding that the ESA is a comprehensive, economic regulatory

73

ld. at 1046-1047.

1d. at 1052-1053.
75 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483.493-495 (4th Cir. 2000).
76 ld. at 488.
77 ld. at 491.
78 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
79 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 49l.
80 1d. at 490.
81 ld. at 491.
82 ld. at 492.
83 See Winemiller, supra note 56, at 180.
84 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493.
85 ld. at 498.
74
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scheme, and that the take provision is an essential part of it. 86 While not
fully explored in Gibbs, this concept was central to the Fifth Circuit
decision to follow.
Another circuit court opinion, GDF Realty Inv. LTD v. Norton
("GDF"), involving the projected taking of an endangered Cave Species
Spider, but ultimately relied on the "comprehensive scheme rationale" to
reaffirm the ESA as constitutional in intrastate species situations. 87 The
court reasoned that the ESA's protections are economic in nature due to
the incalculable value of genetic heritage. 88 In addition, the "ESA is
truly national in scope," and comprehensive in nature. 89 But for the
regulation of each individual take, the ESA's comprehensive scheme
would be undercut and would "lead to piece-meal extinctions.,,9o
GDF rejected the view that the "regulated activity" of the ESA
should be defined as the action (in this case, it was commercial
development) that caused the projected takes of the Cave Species. 9J
Three months later, the D.C. Circuit turned its back on GDF and
embraced that very view in Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, involving the
taking of the intrastate Southwestern Arroyo Toad.92 The D.C. Circuit
did not attempt to give the toad economic characteristics. Instead, the
court reasoned that in a Commerce Clause analysis of the ESA, the
element that needs to be examined for economic characteristics is not the
taking of the species or the species themselves, but the activity that is the
cause of the takes. 93 The D.C. Circuit held that ESA regulates those
"offending activities" that commit the takes, not the takes themselves. 94
Here, the activity that is causing the takes, development, is an economic
activity and can therefore qualify under the "substantial effects" prong of
Lopez. 95 The opinion is significant because it represents the first case in
ESA jurisprudence which bases its entire decision on the rationale of
redefining the target of the ESA's regulation as the offending activity.
The D.C. Circuit later denied Rancho Viejo's petition for rehearing
en banc. 96 The two dissenting opinions from Justice Roberts and Justice

Id . at 497.
GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) ("GDF').
88 Id. at 639; H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4.
89 GDF, 326 F.3d at 639.
90 Id. at 640-641.
91 Id. at 633-636.
92 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
93 Id. at 1072.
94
Id .
86

87

95

/d. at 1070.

96

Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (2003) reh'g denied.
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Sentelle reflect concerns that this case represents a divergence of the
circuit courts from contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence. 97 Justice
Roberts stated in his dissent that only the regulations and laws
themselves can satisfy the Lopez framework, not the offending activity.98
He then commented that the "taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of
its own, lives its entire life in California .... ,,99 Roberts's comment may
indicate his judicial view against federal regulation for intrastate species,
one that he may carry with him to his new position as Chief Justice.

II.

ApPL YING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE To THE ESA

The ESA was passed through the Commerce Clause, which
regulates interstate commerce and traditionally requires some connection
to commerce in order to be valid. IOl
Species protection is not
categorically commercial in nature, which has raised concerns about the
ESA's constitutionality.102 Within the Commerce Clause, the focus on
commercial activity provoked cases like Lopez and Morrison to rely
heavily on the commercial/economic requirement in their decisions that
the Commerce Clause did not apply to non-economic, intrastate
activities. 103 Recently, Raich applied that precedent in support of federal
regulation. I04 This Comment contends that Lopez's and Morrison's
ambiguities contribute to a flawed Commerce Clause framework. 105 In
addition, this Comment proposes that Raich actually misapplies
precedent to effectuate an ends-oriented decision. 106

A.

THE FLAWED COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF LOPEZ AND
MORRISON

While never formally overruled, the Supreme Court in Lopez pulled
away from Wickard's large grant of power and limited Congress's
Id. (Sentelle & Roberts 11., dissenting).
/d. (Roberts, 1., dissenting).
99 1d .
97

98

101 See also Winemiller, supra note 56, at 170-172 (discussing the different interpretations of
what the Commerce Clause requires).
102 Daniell. Lowenberg, The Texas Cave Bug and the California Arroyo Toad "Take" on the
Constitution's Commerce Clause, 36 ST. MARY'S L.l. 149,160 (2004).
103 See Scopp, supra note 8, at 799.
104 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2205-2215.
105 See infra notes 107-140 and accompanying text.
106 See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
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authority under the Commerce Clause. 107 Many argue that Lopez and
Morrison represent flawed legal analyses, not because they narrowed the
scope of the Commerce Clause, but because they did so using ambiguous
standards that are difficult to apply to future cases.108 Through either the
Supreme Court's inability or unwillingness to clarify the standards and
requirements of the Commerce Clause analysis, the current Court is left
with a flawed framework to decide future cases. This lack of guidance
leaves the Commerce Clause vulnerable to dangerous interpretations that
have the capacity to reach outside the scope of current precedent. The
Court would then have the opportunity to either extend the Commerce
Clause to situations past that of Wickard or decimate the power of the
Commerce Clause altogether, as unintended by the Lopez progeny.
1.

Flaw #1: The Amorphous Economic Standard

One problem with Lopez and its progeny is that the term,
"economic," has not been consistently defined. 109 Often, cases use
"economic" interchangeably with "commerce," which is not entirely
accurate. 110 In Lopez, the Supreme Court does not define what is
economic. They simply dismiss the certain activities as being noneconomic. lll Despite the fact that it is a pivotal determination in the
Commerce Clause analysis,112 what is "economic" remains an evolving,
amorphous standard. ll3 Lopez's and Morrison's economic requirement
seems to preclude the Commerce Clause from applying to the ESA since
the ESA protects intrastate subjects that have, arguably, little to no
economic value. I 14 Controversy remains, however, over whether the
ESA's effects are economic, and whether these are adequate enough to
affirm the ESA's constitutionality.ll5 Since Lopez and Morrison provide
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See also Scopp, supra note 8, at 810-814 (discussing the inadequacies of the
Lopez/Morrison framework in application to the ESA).
109 Scopp, supra note 8, at 811-812.
110 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (using "commerce"); See id. at 565 (using "economic
activity").
III [d. at 565.; See Scopp, supra note 8, at 811-812, nn.160 & 165.
112 Scopp, supra note 8, at 810.
113 [d.; Mank, supra note 8, at 928, n.30.
114 Mank, supra note 8, at 924, nn.1O &11.
115 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493-495 (relying on a rationale where red wolves provide for an
industry); GDF 326 F.3d at 637,640 (relying on a rationale that each individual take fits into a larger
regulatory economic scheme of the ESA because the Cave Species spider does not provide such
industries); NAHB 130 F.3d at 1052-1054 (relying on the potential value of endangered species as
opposed to actual economic value); See also Mank, supra note 8, at 992, 996-997 (discussing the
different rationales).
107
108
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little guidance on the issue,116 what the current Court will determine as
"economic" is difficult to predict.
2.

Flaw #2: The Unstated Object of Regulation

When analyzing the ESA in a Commerce Clause analysis, the
ESA's object (or target) of regulation needs to be economic in order to
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce under the Lopez test's
third prong. ll7 Lopez and Morrison, once again, provide little guidance
on how to determine what the ESA's object of regulation is. 118
Some circuit courts viewed the "offending activity" as the object of
regulation, claiming that the ESA places restrictions on activities that
would harm an endangered species. 119 Others claim that the ESA is
regulating the taking of the species, regardless of the nature of the
activity that is doing the taking. 120 Many speculate on what the ESA is
truly regulating, and whether or not the object of that regulation is
economic in nature. l2l While the ESA's constitutionality turns on this
seemingly simple analysis,122 there are several ways to apply it to the
ESA based on existing jurisprudence. Lopez, Morrison, Raich and
Wickard shed some light on what the Supreme Court considers the
"regulated activity" to be, but do not directly answer these inquiries. 123
In each case, the challenged statute regulated some intrastate
activity which the Court then deemed to be economic or noneconomic. 124 In Lopez, Morrison, Wickard and Raich, the regulated
activities are fairly unambiguous. In Lopez, it was the possession of a
. ,It was gen der-motIvate
.
dcnme.
'
126 In Ul"
k d
h an dgun. 125 In M orTlson,
yy lC ar ,
127
And in Raich, it
it was the marketing of wheat in excess of a quota.
Scopp, supra note 8, at 811.
117 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; See also Scopp, supra note 8, at 810-811.
118 Scopp, supra note 8, at 810.
119 Rancho Viejo, F.3d at1072; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495.
120 Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 337.
121 Mank, supra note 8, at 991-996; Matthews, supra note 8, at 947-948; Scopp, supra note 8,
at 803-804; Winemiller, supra note 56, at 184-186.
122 Scopp, supra note 8, at 810.
123 Winemiller, supra note 56, at 171-175.
124 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (finding that the intrastate activity was non-economic); Morrison,
529 U.S. at 613 (finding that the intrastate activity was non-economic); Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2211
(finding that the intrastate activity was economic); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (stating that the
homegrown wheat is not "commerce," but is intertwined in the economic activity of the wheat
industry).
125 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
126 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
127 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
116
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was the cultivation of medical marijuana. 128 While the ESA seems to
regulate, or prohibit, the taking of listed species, the ESA also places
controls on the activity that causes the "takes" of those species.
Deciding what the ESA is truly regulating is an essential step in the
analysis because it determines what the Court analyzes for economic
character l29 for the purpose of aggregating under Wickard. 130 If the
"regulated activity" of the ESA is found to be the actual taking of the
species, the Court might not aggregate the effects of those takes due to
their non-economic nature, because pursuant to Wickard, only economic
activity may be aggregated. 131 If the "regulated activity" of the ESA is
the offending activity, the Court will look to this activity to deem
whether it is economic in nature. Those who advocate the former view,
that the "regulated activity" is the takes themselves, rely on the plain
language of the ESA which clearly prohibits "taking" a listed species. 132
The statute does not prohibit development, grading earth in preparation
of development, or anything else that might have commercial
implications. 133 The statute plainly prohibits the "taking" of a listed
species, whatever the motivation. 134 The language in Rancho Viejo,
Gibbs, and Wickard promotes the latter view, that the "regulated
activity" is the offending activity. 135 Gibbs discussed that since the
reasons for taking the red wolves were economically motivated, the takes
took on an economic nature. 136 In addition to wheat being an agricultural
commodity, the Wickard Court held that the intrastate cultivation of
wheat was economically motivated. 137 Wickard discussed how a farmer,
growing wheat for his personal use on the farm, would be economically
enticed to distribute that wheat in an interstate market due to rising
prices. 138 In both cases, the motivation of the takes played a crucial role
in determining whether or not the activity was economic in character.
The D.C. Circuit in Rancho Viejo identified the ESA's object of
Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2211.
Scopp, supra note 8, at 810 (discussing the importance of "object of regulation" inquiry).
130 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. finding that though the appellee's activity of growing wheat for
self-consumption was "commerce," the wheat industry itself was an economic enterprise; /d. at 127128 (finding that though minimal, the appellee's acts taken together with others in the same position,
might exert a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce).
131 [d. at 127-128.
132 Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 337.
133 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973).
134 [d.
128

129

See infra notes 136-140.
Gibbs, 214 F.3d. at 492, 495.
137 Wickard. 317 U.S. at 128.
138 [d.
135

136
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regulation as the offending activity.139 The majority stated that "[t]he
ESA does not purport to tell toads what they mayor may not do. Rather,
Section 9 limits the taking of listed species, and its prohibitions and
corresponding penalties apply to the persons who do the taking, not to
the species that are taken.,,140 Rancho Viejo marks the first time this
rationale was used as the primary basis for affirming the ESA's
constitutionality, but the issue still remains blurred at the Supreme Court
level. The statutes in Lopez, Morrison, Wickard and Raich do not lend
themselves to a smooth application to the ESA and make it difficult to
understand the full effect of those decisions.
B.

RAICH' s MrSAPPLICATION

OF PRECEDENT

Based on Lopez and Morrison, we know that handgun-possession
crimes and gender-motivated crimes do not fit into the Commerce
Clause,141 but we have only a vague vision of what does. In addition, the
exact legal effect of Wickard remained untested until the Supreme Court
decided Raich, which extended Commerce Clause authority to the
federal regulation of intrastate production, distribution and consumption
of medical marijuana. 142
1.

Raich Misapplies Wickard

While the majority opinion cited the analytical framework of Lopez
and Morrison to support its decision, the Raich Court also relied upon
the early case of Wickard in a lengthy factual and legal comparison. 143
Those looking not to expand the scope of the Commerce Clause,
however, could find many considerable differences between Raich and
Wickard.
When the Court looked at the similarities between Wickard and
Raich, it discussed how the intrastate production of each commodity

Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at \072.
1d.
141 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
142 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215.
143 The Supreme Court in Wickard held that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the
authority to regulate intrastate production and consumption of wheat. The Court stated that the
aggregate effects of one man's production of wheat would affect the interstate market of that
commodity, and therefore can be regulated (Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-129). While Wickard was
never explicitly overruled, the subsequent line of Commerce Clause cases that came nearly 60 years
after Wickard, including Lopez and Morrison, receded from Wickard's broad grant of authority.
Lopez and Morrison restrained the scope of the Commerce Clause without overruling Wickard (See
Mank, supra note 8, at 955).
139

140
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could easily be pulled or enticed into the interstate market because of
economic motivations, creating a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. l44 Several aspects are wrong with Raich' s application of
Wickard in this instance.
First, Raich is unclear about the nature or size of the market that
will be affected by this conversion of intrastate commodities to interstate
commodities. 145 The Court in Raich states that Americans pay 10.5
billion dollars a year for marijuana, however, the Court does not indicate
whether this revenue is for medical or recreational use. 146 The Court
ignores the distinction between the two markets, and ignores the
considerable differences between the twO. 147 Wickard was concerned
with the economic effect that unchecked production of intrastate wheat
would have on the interstate wheat market. 148 Raich attempts to parallel
its case to Wickard by claiming that the unchecked cultivation of
intrastate marijuana would substantially affect the interstate market for
it. 149 The cultivation and consumption of medical marijuana would not
likely substantially affect the interstate commerce of the marijuana
market in the same way as the cultivation and consumption of wheat in
the 1930s affected the interstate wheat market. Wheat can be legally
grown by any landowner, whereas medical marijuana can only be legally
grown by those permitted to do so based on their medical requirements.
One would logically reason that the quantity of marijuana being pulled
into the interstate market is much smaller than the potential quantity of
wheat being pulled into the interstate market, simply based on those
authorized to grow the crop. 150 Therefore, one must conclude that adding
a limited intrastate market for medical marijuana would not substantially
affect interstate commerce to the same extent as in Wickard.
Raich claims that the introduction of intrastate medical marijuana
into the interstate market might leave a "gaping hole" in the CSA. 151
However, the intrastate market would be limited by the potential patients
for whom marijuana was recommended. So, the introduction of this
limited quantity of medical marijuana into the interstate market might not
leave such a "gaping hole" in the CSA's regulatory scheme as Raich had
predicted due to the limited potential pool of people bringing that good
Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2206-2207.
See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
146 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2208, n.31.
147 [d. at 2208.
148 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-129.
149 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2207.
150 However, this does not take into account those who grow marijuana illegally.
151 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2209.
144
145
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from the intrastate to the interstate market. 152 The ability to predict the
actual effect of deregulation was clear in Wickard, where the Court cited
substantial findings of this nature. 153 Raich cited no findings as to the
actual effect of this deregulation to the degree of certainty that Wickard
. 154
appears to reqUire.
Second, the differences in the Agricultural Adjustment Act
("AAA") and the CSA are too great to be overlooked. The main purpose
of the AAA was price protection of the agricultural industry.155 The
CSA prohibited all marijuana cultivation and possession except in
limited circumstances,156 which appears to parallel closer to controlling
behavior and crime as opposed to regulating market forces. Therefore,
any in-depth comparison of the two statutes is stunted due to their
divergent purposes.
In addition, as an underlying policy consideration, the Court should
not recognize an illegal, recreational market for marijuana in making
decisions about its legal use. In assuming that a thriving illegal market
for marijuana exists, the Court is basing the legality of a useful medical
drug on the prospective criminal activity arising from that illegal
market. 157
While proponents of the ESA currently focus on the legal arguments
in applying Raich broadly to the ESA,158 the primary focus should be on
the consequences in doing so. The Supreme Court expanded the scope
of the Commerce Clause past that of Wickard in an attempt to obtain the
desired holding to regulate a widely abused drug. 159 The Supreme Court
might find considerable differences between the CSA and the ESA and
perhaps not interpret Raich to be applicable to the latter.

2.

Raich Misapplies Lopez and Morrison

Raich distinguishes itself from both Lopez and Morrison by
distinguishing between the economic or non economic character of the
activities at issue. 160 Raich states that the non-economic nature of
152

Id .

Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-129.
Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2226-2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115.
156 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2204 (classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, which has no
legitimate uses and is flatly prohibited by the CSA except for limited scientific purposes).
157 Id. at 2212. As a policy consideration, the Court should not assume that an illegal market
in marijuana will continue to thrive post-CSA.
158 Blumm, supra note 8, at 493-497.
159 See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
160 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2211.
153

154
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handgun possession and gender-motivated violence weighed heavily on
the Court's decision to invalidate the statutes in Lopez and Morrison. 161
Unlike the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, Raich concludes that
the Controlled Substances Act governs "quintessentially economic
activities," "economic" referring to the "production, distribution and
consumption of commodities.,,'62 So even though Raich actually
criminalizes behavior as does Lopez, for example, the Court in Raich
makes a distinction based on the shallow premise that controlled
substances can be "consumed" in the traditional sense of being taken in
by the body, which makes them more of an economic commodity.'63
This is an arbitrary distinction because "consumption" has a broader
meaning as well, which encompasses the general "use" of a good. The
Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez governed the "use" or
"consumption" of handguns, but was not considered "economic" based
on that premise. 164
While the CSA mayor may not have been regulating truly
economic activity, Lopez and Morrison provided little guidance on how
to define the term, "economic", which has led to the arbitrary distinctions
in Raich and will continue to cause confusion and inconsistency in Court
opinions until the ambiguity is resolved. 165
C.

SWANCC, FEDERALISM, AND THE ESA

Intrastate species protections encounter similar legal roadblocks as
intrastate wetland protections, and they might be headed for a similar fate
at the Supreme Court level. Until 2001, intrastate wetlands were
protected under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Then SWANCC, in
which a constitutional limitation was included in the language of the
opinion, rejected the argument that isolated wetlands should be included
in the CWA's protections. 166 In SWANCC, the Court discusses concerns
of federalism, and infringement on state sovereignty in cases that present
federal law attempts to regulate intrastate matters. 167 While SWANCC's
holding is limited to statutory interpretation under the CWA and was not

161
162
163

[d. at 2209-2210.
[d. at 221J.
[d.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
Scopp, supra note 8, at 799-802.
166 While not decided on Commerce Clause grounds, the Supreme Court did include in its
dicta its stance on the limitations of the Clean Water Act to include isolated wetlands and vernal
pools. SWANCC. 531 U.S. at 174.
164

165

167

[d.
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decided under the Commerce Clause,168 the two concepts are inextricably
related in this situation. The discussion of federalism concerns by the
majority in SWANCC easily translates into similar concerns of the ESA
infringing on states' rights under the Commerce Clause. 169 In both cases,
a federal statute dictates what a state must do with its own land resources
in regards to wetlands or to critical habitats. Despite this seemingly
striking similarity, there are also several distinctions between wetland
protections and endangered species protections. 170
One distinction between the two is the possible difference in the
target of the statute's protections. Wetlands, under the CWA are
regulated as part of the geography of the land. 17I Endangered species
and critical habitats designated pursuant to the ESA are regulated as a
means to protect the species themselves.172 Wetlands protections under
the CW A are essentially a land regulation with the indirect protection of
living creatures that the wetlands support, whereas species protections
under the ESA are direct protections of those living creatures. 173 This
distinction is also relevant as a states' rights issue. Land regulation is an
area of traditional state control 174 and is less likely to be relinquished to
the federal government than the regulation of li ving creatures that are not
technically part of the land.
Another distinction turns on the effects of the resources that the
168 SWANCC, though dealing with statutory interpretation, id., provides insight as to what that
Court would argue had it involved Commerce Clause jurisdiction. The majority held that intrastate,
isolated wetlands are not "navigable waters," and therefore, not covered by the Clean Water Act,
which can only assert statutory jurisdiction over navigable waters. This is significant for two
reasons. First, the decision shows that the Court interprets "navigable waters" narrowly, through its
plain meaning, as waters capable of being used for navigation. Therefore, had this case involved
Commerce Clause jurisdiction, the Court would have most likely found that these sorts of wetlands
cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause because they do not fall within the traditional, plain
meaning of the word, commerce. Second, the decision turns on whether these wetlands had a
hydrological connection to a navigable waterway. Since they did not, they were not held to be
navigable waterways. Had the Court found a hydrological nexus between the wetlands and a
navigable waterway, the outcome might have been different. Therefore, the scope of this decision is
unknown because it is factually-driven, determinative upon the finding of a hydrological connection.
[d.; Cf United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (finding a
hydrological nexus).
169 Blumm, supra note 8, at 325-326; Winemiller, supra note 56, at 187-189.
170 See infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text.
171 33 U.S.c. § 1344 (1972).
172 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973).
173 However, this is a technical distinction and could be easily dismissed by a judge who
believes that in protecting the nation's waters, Congress also meant to protect the biodiversity that
exists in those waters.
174 Matthew B. Baumgartner, SWANCC's Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress's
Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate Water Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2158-2159
(2005).
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CWA and the ESA protect and if they are widespread enough to be
considered "national" as opposed to "intrastate.,,175
Protecting
endangered species is an integral step in preserving biodiversity.176
Though the existence of intrastate species is local, the benefits of
biodiversity are felt nationwide (and worldwide).177 Wetlands offer
buffering and filtering of precipitation, minerals, and chemicals. 178 They
provide flood control and are habitats for a significant number of plants
and animals. 179 While all of these are important and valuable functions,
their immediate effects are generally local. In the case of an intrastate
wetland that has no hydrological connection to any navigable waterway
(besides the connection created by the broad argument that all the
nation's waters are connected, no matter how distant they are from one
another), the benefits of that wetlands functions are most likely felt
locally.

m.

How LONG WILL THE ESA's CONSTITUTIONALITY REMAIN
UNDECIDED?

The Supreme Court has not affirmed the ESA's constitutionality.
This may be because of a reluctance to detract from the legislative intent
behind the ESA. The ESA is not only a powerful law but a powerful
message that the preservation of biodiversity is an important value to the
public and to the government that represents the public's interests.
However, considering the following facts, it might be only a matter of
time before the new Roberts Court decides that the Commerce Clause
cannot support provisions of the ESA or the ESA in its entirety.
A.

CIRCUIT COURTS' SPLINTERED RATIONALE

One reason the Supreme Court might grant certiorari in a nearfuture ESA constitutionality case is to decide an unsettled issue of law.
The circuit court cases of NAHB, Gibbs, GDF and Rancho Viejo all
affirmed the ESA was constitutional as applied to intrastate species,180
m Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-618 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568) (''The Constitution requires
a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local .... ").
176 NAHB, l30 F.3d at 1052.
177 [d. at 1052 n.ll.
178 Carey Schmidt, Private Wetlands and Public Values: "Navigable Waters" and the
Significant Nexus Test Under the Clean Water Act, 26 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 97, 97-98
(2005).
179/d.
180 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1057; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 506; GDF, 326 F.3d at 641; Rancho Viejo,
323 F.3d at 1071.
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but did so using very different rationales. 181 While the unified outcome
makes a strong statement in favor of the ESA's constitutionality, the
differences in the rationales undermine the stability of the holdings. 182
Though GDF points out the differing viewpoints among NAHB,
Gibbs and itself,183 it claims it is consistent with these cases as well as
current Commerce Clause precedent. 184 However, GDF rejects the
rationale that Rancho Viejo accepts in its opinion four months later. 18S
This splintered decision-making weakens these circuit court decisions
and makes for precarious precedent. The court system is built on
principles of predictability, precedent, and consistency, but these circuit
court decisions rely on a plethora of justifications. So while they all
claim the ESA is constitutional, they are not in agreement as to why it is
constitutional. The Supreme Court might recognize the need to decide
for itself which rationale, if any, is correct.
B.

WETLANDS AND ENDANGERED SPECIES

In many ways, wetland protection under the CW A paralleled
endangered species protections under the ESA up until 2001 when
SWANCC was decided. 186 Some would even consider intrastate wetlands
decisions at the Supreme Court level as good predictors of how the Court
might treat future intrastate ESA cases. 187 Currently, two of the three
wetlands cases that were granted certiorari by the Supreme Court on
October 11, 2005, involved statutory jurisdictional issues in the same
vein as SWANCc. 188 Both cases arose from the Sixth Circuit, and in both
cases, the courts issued favorable decisions for the federal government,
allowing it to assert jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands. 189 One might
speculate as to what exactly prompted the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari over these cases at this time and whether the ESA is next on the
docket.
Ultimately, granting certiorari signals that some aspect of those
See generally, Mank, supra note 8.
Paul Ziel, Interstate Commerce and Intrastate Endangered Species: The Controversy and
the Need/or Compromise, 20 BYU 1. PUB. L. 167, 184-185 (2005) (discussing how Rancho Viejo
undermines the stability of GDFj.
183 GDF, 326 F.3d at 635-637.
184 1d. at 635.
181

182

Matthews, supra note 8, at 947.
See generally Adler, supra note 20 (discussing similar Constitutional issues encountered
by wetlands protection and endangered species protection).
187 See generally Adler, supra note 20.
188 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
189
1d.
185

186
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cases, or of that area of law was not being dealt with correctly by the
circuit courts. The Supreme Court might look at the ESA in the same
way. Granting certiorari in Rapanos and Carabell may signal the
Supreme Court's potential pursuit of more clarity in environmental
jurisdiction.
IV. THE ESA'S LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT

If the Supreme Court decides to review the ESA's constitutionality,
several factors threaten the Act's likelihood of success. 190 Though the
Court is bound by precedent, individual beliefs inevitably tend to
maneuver their way into any given justice's decision. This Comment
proposes that Raich was a product of judicial activism. 191 In addition,
this Comment speculates that judicial activism may work against
environmental laws in the long run. 192

A.

JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE ESA

Judicial activism 193 permeates the court system and has both
positive and negative impacts. On one hand, judicial activism allows the
Court to analyze the Constitution as an evolving document. Changes in
everything from social viewpoints to ideas of equity and fairness require
the Court to analyze the Constitution flexibly and make it applicable to
current situations. It is in this way that the Court ended segregation in
schools, provided for a woman's right of reproductive bodily autonomy,
and interpreted the Bill of Rights as including within its penumbra a right
to privacy.194 On the other hand, judicial activism includes instances
where judges impose their own views into case opinions. Impartiality is
required of all judges, but preconceived notions of a fair outcome, bias,
and political pressure are all difficult to overlook. Occasionally a judge

191

190 See

infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-20 I and accompanying text.

192

[d.

Judicial activism is a phenomenon used to describe justices who do not construe the words
of statutes and the Constitution closely to their plain meaning if there are circumstances that require
them to interpret the meaning to adapt to those circumstances. In general, judicial activism has a
negative connotation because it creates less predictability in Court decisions and might reflect
personal biases. However, though most judicial liberals are looked at as more activist than judicial
conservatives, this Comment contends that it may be present at both ends of the political spectrum.
See Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court. 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005) (discussing the dichotomy of judicial conservatives).
194 See Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (ordering the end to racial segregation in
public schools); See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion); See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing a right to privacy).
193
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will make an "ends oriented" decision, meaning that he or she decides
what the outcome should be, then finds ways to rationalize it in an
opInIon.
The benefits of judicial activism have advanced the
environmental movement, just as the disadvantages of judicial activism
have proved detrimental.
As applied to the ESA, the effects of judicial activism could be
determinative at the Supreme Court level. This Comment contends that
Raich was a product of j~dicial activism within the Supreme Court. 195
Many agree that "while the Raich majority purports to be following the
doctrinal contours of Lopez and Morrison, it actually represents a
repudiation of th[o]se prior cases."I96 In addition, many factual and legal
differences exist between Raich and Wickard and should have been
distinguished further in the Raich opinion. 197 Raich 's outcome was
partially based on the subject matter of the case. The federal government
took a stand on the "war on drugs" and Raich represents immense
support from the judiciary for that crusade. 198 If the Court were faced
with the ESA rather than the CSA, it might not have reached the same
conclusion so readily. The ESA does not regulate the health and safety
of the public to the extent of the CSA. 199 In addition, the ESA has
formidable opponents with deep pockets, tenth amendment concerns, and
promises to revive economically depressed regions with new
development. These differences might matter to an activist jUdiciary. As
long as activism is present in the court system, the legal status of
environmental laws like the ESA will never be certain or safe.
On the other hand, judicial activism could also help the ESA
succeed at the Supreme Court level if the Court recognizes that the
Commerce Clause should evolve as changing circumstances require.
Gibbs stated that commerce should not be confined to its 18th century
form. 20o Many could argue that this statement directly expands the role
of the Commerce Clause into supporting environmental laws that are not
traditionally commercial. The danger in this interpretation would be the
broad overuse of the Commerce Clause, which would upset many who
believe that the original intent of the Clause was to provide for regulation
of interstate commerce in the more traditional sense.

See supra notes 193-194; see infra notes 196-20 I and accompanying text.
See generally Jonathan Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005).
197 See supra notes 143-159 and accompanying text.
198 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2202.
199 The CSA regulates controlled substances, which are related to public health. Raich, 125
S.Ct. at 2203 (stating that the CSA sought to conquer drug abuse).
200 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491.
195

196

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 8

512

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Either way, judicial activism is present and remains a factor in the
ESA's likelihood of affirmation at the Supreme Court leve1. 201 The
following subpart explores how the composition of the Court will reveal
which direction judicial activism will take.
B.

THE ROBERTS COURT

The Supreme Court's nine justices hold their positions for life, 202 so
changes in the Court composition are rare, though recently, the Supreme
Court has undergone four significant changes. With the addition of
Justices Roberts and Alito and the loss of Justice O'Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, many speculate as to what interpretive changes in the
law will ensue?03
Raich is binding precedent. However, the new Roberts Court would
likely see weaknesses in applying Raich to the ESA and decide against
using Raich' s rationale in ESA cases?04 Based on his dissent in Rancho
Viejo, Justice Roberts appears as if he would likely be a stark opponent
to reaffirming the ESA's constitutionality concerning intrastate
components of habitat and species protection. 205 Some contend that
Roberts will be bound by the decision in Raich and will be forced to
construe the Commerce Clause broadly.206 To counter this argument,
this Comment cautions that Lopez and Morrison also represent good law
which narrows the scope of the Commerce Clause?07 In addition, the
ESA can be distinguished from the CSA in Raich. 208 Because of these
variables, Raich supports the ESA due to its reading of Commerce
Clause authority, however it cannot be solely (or firmly) relied upon in
the Roberts Court. Roberts' jurisprudence suggests that he provides a
"willingness to closely scrutinize acts of Congress to ensure they are a
201 Though judicial activism and judicial conservatism are seen as opposites, many judicial
conservatives still maintain an activist role by deciding cases in part by the subject matter of the
case.
202 But See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five
Takes. 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 922 (2005) (rejecting a proposal that Supreme Court
justices be elected for a single 18 year term as opposed to their current lifetime term).
203 See generally Adler, supra note 196, (analyzing Justice Kennedy and his versatile role on
the Supreme Court); See also Jeff Bleich, Michelle Friedland & Daniel Powell, The New Chief 66NOV OR. ST. B. BULL. 18 (2005) (discussing Justice Roberts' role as the new Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court).
204 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
205 Bleich, supra note 203, at 23.
206 Blumm, supra note 8, at 498; Ziel, supra note 182, at 185.
207 Lopez and Morrison were not overruled by Raich and remain binding precedent; See
generally Adler, supra note 196 (discussing the effect Raich will have on Morrison).
208 See supra notes 143-149 and accompanying text.
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proper exercise of the Commerce power.,,209
In addition to Justice Roberts, several other variables exist within
the current composition of the Supreme Court. Justices Scalia and
Thomas are threats to the ESA mainly because of their strict
constructionist views of Constitutional and statutory interpretation. 2lO
Furthermore, newly confirmed Justice Alito is also labeled a strict
constructionist, which has earned him the moniker, "Scalito," meaning
"Little Scalia.,,211 Justice Alito replaces Justice O'Connor, who was the
deciding vote in many crucial social justice cases. 212 Her retirement
removed a neutral middleman justice from the Supreme Court.213 These
changes in Supreme Court composition mayor may not be determinative
in an ESA case. Unfortunately, many of the changes indicate that if the
new members of the Court make any impact at all, it will not favor the
ESA.
V.

THREE PLAUSIBLE SOLUTIONS

This Comment explored the likelihood of the ESA's "take"
provision being upheld by the Supreme Court, and came to the
disheartening conclusion that the likelihood is slim.214 Three plausible
solutions exist within the states, the legislature, and the Supreme Court.
A.

FEDERALISM: EXCLUSIVE STATE AUTHORITY

Some environmental laws incorporate aspects of cooperative
federalism into their provisions.215 However, the arguments for giving
exclusive authority to the states to protect intrastate species and critical
habitats are weak. This subpart of the Comment explores the benefits

Bleich, supra note 203 at 23.
See generally, Claeys, supra note 193.
211 Shannon
P. Duffy, LAW.COM The Mild-Mannered Scalia, Feb. II, 2006,
http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=I046288236052.
212 Though Justice O'Connor was a swing vote on many social issues, she was in the majority
in many cases that limited the scope of Commerce Clause authority (See majority opinions of Lopez,
Morrison and SWANCC, supra notes 9 & 46). The addition of Alito and Roberts would therefore
probably not affect the Court's decisions concerning those rules of law.
213 Her likely "middleman" replacement would be Justice Kennedy; See also Adler, supra
note 196, at 768-769 (stating that though Kennedy joined the majority in Raich, he is known for his
strong views on state autonomy).
214 See supra notes 180-213 and accompanying text.
215 Cooperative federalism divides responsibilities between federal and state entities by
allowing the federal government to make "floors," or minimum standards. The states can then create
more stringent standards more tailored to their individual needs as long as it meets the minimum laid
out by the federal government.
209

210
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and weaknesses of allowing states to exclusively regulate intrastate
endangered species. To remedy these weaknesses, some propose giving
incentives to the states so they will be motivated to promulgate stringent
protections. 216
While the Supreme Court found in SWANCC that states were best
equipped to regulate intrastate wetlands exclusively, it does not precisely
follow that states are best equipped to regulate intrastate endangered
species exclusively. As stated in Section I, supra, wetlands serve a very
important ecosystem function of both buffering and filtering rain and
run-off as well as providing habitats for many plants and animals.217
They mostly, however, affect only the area or state they are located in
which make them largely a land use issue, which has traditionally been
left to the states. 218 Biodiversity loss and extinction, even in an intrastate
species, however, affect more than just the state where the species is
located. The effects of biodiversity loss cross state lines and reverberate
through the entire world.219 In addition, many species that are now only
located within one state, once had an interstate population that crossed
borders and would probably have fallen under the Commerce Clause,
such as in Gibbs with the red wolf population,z2o Ironically, some of
these species might not be able to remain under the ESA's protection
because we neglected to safeguard them before their populations became
so small that they became confined within a single state.
Many argue that federal jurisdiction over intrastate endangered
species serves to prevent a "race to the bottom.,,221 Allowing states to set
their own environmental standards leaves intrastate resources vulnerable
to deregulation in an attempt to attract industry and business to that state.

216 See Winemiller, supra note 56, at 198-199 (suggesting compensating developers by
offering them tax credits and subsidies when they encounter situations where they own land where
endangered species are found to exist).
However, this article contends that motivating states to
enact more stringent protections for endangered species and critical habitats strikes the correct
balance between allowing states to distribute compensation how they see fit as opposed to directly
overcompensating developers for simply complying with the ESA. States may choose to
compensate landowners and developers in this way, but giving states the responsibility to disperse
the funds preserves ideals of state autonomy while still ensuring better environmental protections, all
the while bypassing a Commerce Clause conflict.
217 Schmidt, supra note 178, at 97-99.
218 Mank, supra note 8, at 959.
219 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052 (supporting the theory that preserving any given intrastate species
would benefit not only the single state in which the species is located, but would contribute to the
ultimate benefits of genetic variation and species diversity conservation).
220 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488.
221 The phrase, "race to the bottom" is used to describe situations where states promote
relaxed standards in order to attract more business and industry. A competition begins between
states to see which can lower their standards the most in order to profit economically.
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This is especially dangerous in the case of biodiversity loss where the
distribution of endangered species is not uniform throughout the country
and where some states hold a large share of these species. However, as
mentioned supra, states can be prompted to implement more stringent
regulations of their own through the use of economic incentives. 222 If
states are compensated for the loss of development due to the large
presence of endangered species within their borders, then the race to the
bottom might not be an issue. However, one cannot overlook the
argument that giving states exclusive authority to regulate the "takings"
of intrastate endangered species would be to strip the federal government
of the power to prevent biodiversity loss. This would have global
repercussions.
B.

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

In certain cases, legislative solutions might be the only remaining
option for some aspects of environmental law. This Comment contends
that the ESA is in need of a legislative solution which will eventually
lead to the correct legal outcome. In addition to providing economic
incentives in order to motivate states to enact strict regulations, supra, 223
two other solutions exist within formal legislative processes.
1.

Constitutional Amendment

The Constitution has been amended for a number of reasons, most
all of which were to advance the social and legal evolution of this
country.224 While amending the Constitution could take a long time and
could prove to be ineffective against near-future attacks on the ESA, it
would prove to be the most effective method to ensure stability in the
court system for environmental laws in the long run.
If the Commerce Clause was never intended to be used to pass laws
like the ESA that have intrastate, arguably non-economic properties, then
perhaps a different authority is needed to ensure full protection of the
environment. 225 An environmental amendment in the US Constitution
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
224 U.S. CONST. amend. Xli (abolishing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (granting suffrage
to all races); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX am (granting suffrage to women).
225 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215-2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the CSA be upheld
through the Necessary and Proper Clause); See also Dan L. Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A
Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to Presen'e, Protect, and Promote the
Environment, 32 Ecology L. Q. 821, 846 (2005) (claiming that the Constitution itself is too flawed
to support environmental laws, which has resulted in the confusion and conflict over the current
222

223
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would allow Congress to enact environmental laws without the use of the
Commerce Clause, in an effort to protect a precious resource common to
all people. In addition, a precautionary principle should be adopted
especially concerning threats of irreversible damage to the
environment. 226
Environmental impacts are felt on local, national, and global
scales.228 Those impacts cross state lines and know no boundaries of
race or ethnicity.229 An environmental amendment would not only
substantively solve the issue of intrastate, non-economic protections, but
might also signal a paradigm shift in this country in recognizing the right
to a healthy environment.
Many other countries have incorporated some sort of declaration in
favor of environmental protection and stewardship of the Earth in their
Constitutions. 23o These declarations come in the form of preambles,
rights, duties and fundamental freedoms that the government is required
to protect. 231 Modeling a Constitutional amendment for the United States
after language from any number of countries would not only promote
environmental freedoms in our own country, but would make an
international statement that the United States is prepared to be
responsible for its environment and future inhabitants.
Environmental problems are unlikely to diminish in the near future.
More environmental laws are needed with each passing decade to
address these problems that are not diminishing, but rather growing in
number and intensity. We need to recognize this epidemic by ensuring
the passing and enforcement of more aggressive environmental laws.
Passing an environmental constitutional amendment would guarantee the
stability of environmental laws, and would increase the predictability in
regards to the Supreme Court upholding them or not.

environmental agenda).
226 See e.g, RIO DECLARATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Principle IS,
available
at
http://www .unep.orgIDocuments.multilinguallDefault.asp ?DocumentID= 78&ArticleID= 1163
227 See e.g., STOCKHOLM DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, Principle 21,

available

at

http://www.unep.orgIDocuments.multilinguallDefault.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503
228 See supra note 219.
229

[d.

230 Don Anton, Australia -- Comparative Constitutional Language for Environmental
Amendments to the Australian Constitution, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE, May

31, 2006, http://www.elaw.org!resources/text.asp?ID=1082.
231 [d.
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ESA Amendment

A statutory amendment to the ESA has many advantages over a
Constitutional Amendment, but also exerts less power over the stability
of future environmental laws due to its narrow focus. 232 To be effective,
an ESA amendment would have to safeguard against the deficiencies
found in the statutes by Lopez and Morrison, as follows. 233
The Lopez Court identified four factors that could aid the Court in
its determination of an activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce?34 First, an activity is more likely to substantially affect
interstate commerce when it involves "commerce" or some kind of
economic enterprise. 235 Second is the presence of a jurisdictional
element "which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry" that the
activity affects interstate commerce. 236 Third is whether or not findings
exist to expressly support the notion that the activity substantially affects
interstate commerce.237 Fourth is the causal link between the activity and
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and whether that link is too
attenuated?38 If Congress amended the ESA so as to block future
judicial challenges based on the four Lopez factors, the Supreme Court
would likely find the ESA constitutional even under Lopez's strict
framework.
By amending the ESA to clarify the statute through additional
language or additional findings, Congress would evince its intent in
passing the ESA through the Commerce Clause. Primarily, Congress can
design this amendment after one of two options. The first option is
tailored after Rancho Viejo's attempt to define the regulated activity of
the ESA. 239 The second option follows the concurrence in NAHB in
recognizing Congress's power to prevent destructive interstate
competition. 24o
a.

Option 1: Defining Development as the Regulated Activity
The Rancho Viejo majority identified the ESA's regulated activity

232 An amendment to a statute can be passed quicker, and altered easier. In addition, it will be
more narrowly tailored to the particular problems with the ESA.
233 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559·560; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-619.
234 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-560.
235 Id. at 559.
236 Id. at 560.
237
1d.
238
1d.
239
240

See infra notes 241-257 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 258-264 and accompanying text.
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as the offending activity, which is economic in nature and substantially
affects interstate commerce?41 By defining the regulated activity of the
ESA, Rancho Viejo attempts to clarify the statute and offer the Supreme
Court direction in interpreting the ESA. Though not decided solely on
this rationale, the Gibbs court also supported the idea that economic
motivations can be used to satisfy the "economic" requirement of
Lopez. 242 However, the Supreme Court will likely accept this rationale
only if it is clear that Congress intended it. If the legislature were clearly
to spell out that the ESA's regulated activity is the offending activity,
then the Supreme Court would most likely defer. 243
Unfortunately, this option exposes a problem of scope. 244 Under
Rancho Viejo's rationale, the ESA's "take" provision will only be
constitutional if the regulated activity in any given situation is
economically motivated. This would exclude the non-economically
motivated taker from being covered under the ESA. 245 In addition to the
scope of this rationale being too narrow, it might be too broad as well.
Some argue that this rationale covers nearly every situation where a
taking of an endangered species occurs since most activity that would
take a species occurs due to some sort of economic incentive. 246
Aside from the criticism this option receives,247 an amendment
using this rationale could easily dispel confusion as to what the regulated
activity of the ESA is, solving one of the problems that the precedent
creates. By Congress conveying its clear intent, the judiciary would
defer to the plain language included in the ESA amendment. 248
Additionally, an amendment tailored after this approach would include
241

Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072; [d. at 1080 (Ginsburg, 1., concurring)

242

[d.

243 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (declared a two part
test now known as the "Chevron deference", whereby the Court, in reviewing an agency
interpretation will first determine whether the plain language of the statute is clear, and in finding
that it is not, will defer to that agency interpretation so long as it is reasonable).
244 See Ziel, supra note 182, at 187-190 (discussing the drawbacks to taking an approach as in
Rancho Viejo).
245 Without a jurisdictional element, the non-commercially motivated take and the
commercially motivated take are treated the same which causes issues with the facial validity of the
ESA, passed under the Commerce Clause. See Adler, supra note 196, at 775 ("A teenager's spiteful
use of a slingshot can be just as criminal as a developer's profit-seeking use of land movers."
Concerning a facial challenge, ''the federal government's authority to regulate both activities will
rise or fall together").
246 See Adler, supra note 20, at 409 (stating that not only is the rationale in Rancho Viejo too
broad, but it is in contention with Lopez); See also Matthews, supra note 8, at 948 (stating that
Rancho Viejo has shortcomings, but they are a reflection of the poor framework of Lopez and
Morrison).
247 See Ziel, supra note 182.
248 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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findings which would conclude that the majority of takings occur
because of commercial development or economic motivations by way of
poaching or illegal trafficking. An amendment of this nature would work
primarily because it would allow little opportunity for the Supreme Court
to formulate an activist decision, either for or against the ESA. An ESA
amendment would allow the Supreme Court to look to the plain language
alone, which many of the justices would agree is the most accurate
method of statutory interpretation?49
An amendment drafted in this way satisfies three of Lopez's four
requirements, supra?50 First, by defining the regulated activity as the
thing that causes the takings, the regulated activity becomes economic in
nature as long as the offending activity is an economic endeavor. 251
Second, the Comment suggests adding findings to support the conclusion
that the activity causing the takes is the regulated activity of the ESA. 252
Though the existence of findings is not determinative as to whether or
not the statute will be found constitutional,253 the Supreme Court has
criticized statutes without such findings and found those statutes to be
unconstitutional. 254 Also, the causal link between the regulated activity
and commerce is clear when the takings occur as a result of an economic
endeavor. 255 To satisfy Lopez's fourth factor, Congress might also
include a jurisdictional element which would provide that the ESA can
only regulate those things that substantially affect interstate commerce,
are an instrumentality of interstate commerce or are channels of interstate
commerce. Like the absence of findings, the absence of a jurisdictional
element is not fatal. 256 However, Lopez heavily criticized the Gun Free
School Zone Act for lacking a jurisdictional element that would more
readily link the activity to interstate commerce.257

249 See Claeys, supra note 193, at 797 (Justice Scalia is a strict constructionist, "erring on the
side of minimalism" (Id.)).
250 See supra 234-238 notes and accompanying text.
251 Rancho Viejo, 130 F.3d at 1072.
252 See supra note 237.
253 Rancho Viejo, 130 F.3d at 1069 (stating that " ... neither findings nor legislative history is
necessary").
254 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasizing that though " ... Congress is not normally required
to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce,"
they aid the Court in finding a connection where one is not apparent to the naked eye).
255 Rancho Viejo, 130 F.3d at 1068 (comparing the instant case to NAHB in that both involve
regulated activities that are characterized as economic development, creating a clear connection to
interstate commerce).
256 Id. (stating that the absence of a jurisdictional hook did not dissuade the NAHB Court
from finding the ESA constitutional).
257 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
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Option 2: Preventing a "Race to the Bottom" Among the Several
States

The NAHB court concurrence held that the taking of species can be
regulated as something that substantially affects interstate commerce
because it is the product of destructive interstate competition, something
that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent. 258 This theory of
preventing a "race to the bottom" is tied closely with the concerns of
allowing states to hold exclusive jurisdiction over intrastate species,
supra?59
An amendment should state that Congress utilized its power to
prevent destructive interstate competition between states in passing the
ESA through the Commerce Clause. Language of this nature would
provide a basis for the Supreme Court to find that regulating intrastate
activity pursuant to the ESA's take provision is within Congress's power.
Given the statistics of existing destructive interstate competition, 260
regulating intrastate takes are necessary to achieve that important
governmental purpose. Without federal regulation of intrastate takes,
states might adopt their own loose protections in order to introduce new
industry within their borders. 261 This argument is closely tied to the
many problems that exist with giving states exclusive authority to protect
intrastate species, supra. 262 The distribution of species across the states
is overwhelmingly disproportionate. 263 In addition to distribution
concerns, not all states may share the vision of protecting species to the
extent mandated by the ESA. The Court has established that federal
regulation is appropriate to prevent this destructive interstate
competition. 264

C.

AFFIRMING THE COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME RATIONALE

Relying heavily on the reasoning in Morrison, the GDF court stated
that a regulated activity may be considered economic when it is an
essential part of a larger economic regulatory scheme, which could be

NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
260 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053-1057 (discussing the different activities that the Court has found
to be vulnerable to destructive interstate competition).
261 See supra note 221.
258

259

262

1d.

V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 889 (4th ed. 2003).
264 See supra note 258.

263 ROBERT
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undercut but for the particular intrastate regulation. 265 In showing a
regulatory scheme, the court used the original ESA findings. 266 These
findings evinced a clear economic regulatory purpose in enacting the
ESA to combat the accelerated extinction rate due to economic
activity,z67 Discussed in the opinion, House Report No. 93-412 and
Senate Report No.91-526 illustrate how the ESA's protections are
economic in nature. 268 Though the GDF court reiterated that the Cave
Species Spider is not economic or commercial in any way,269 the
economic effects of biodiversity as well as the economic motivations
present behind the takes give an economic character to the takes
themselves. 27o In addition to requiring the larger regulation to be
directed at economic activity,271 GDF also reiterates that the activity
needs to be an "essential" component to the larger regulatory scheme.272
Even de minimus takes are essential to prevent undercutting the goals of
the ESA by preventing piecemeal extinction. 273
The Supreme Court should follow GDF for three primary reasons.
First, the Supreme Court used the comprehensive-scheme rationale in
deciding Raich, 274 which is now binding precedent. 275 The concern,
however, in applying Raich is that many factual differences exist
between the CSA and the ESA which might cause a different outcome
for the ESA. 276 Since this Comment suggests that Raich was a product of
judicial activism,277 it cannot predict whether the Roberts Court will
honor Raich by applying it to the ESA or whether it will read it narrowly
so as to limit its impact on other areas of law. If the Court chooses to
adhere to the rationale in Raich, it is likely that the Court would also
uphold the ESA in subsequent challenges. 278 The second reason the
Court should follow GDF is that safeguards exist within the

265

GDF, 326 F.3d at 630.

266

[d. at 638.

267

Id. at 639; 16 U.S.C. §1531 (1973).

GDF, 326 F.3d at 639 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4).
269/d. at 625.
270 /d. at 639.
268

271/d.
272 /d.
273

Id., at 640.

Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2203 ("Congress devised a closed regulatory system").
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493 (This rationale was also discussed by the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs
though was not central to its holding because Gibbs already found that the red wolves themselves
were economic in nature (Id. at 271 )).
276 See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
278 See Ziel, supra note 182.
274
275
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comprehensive scheme rationale to prevent it from being too narrow or
overbroad. As discussed in GDF, the individual activity must be an
essential component to the comprehensive scheme, with its deregulation
undercutting the entire scheme. 279 This provides a two step analysis,
supra,280 which can ensure limited, yet adequate scope. The final reason
why the Court should follow GDF is that the Fifth Circuit actually
unifies the seemingly splintered circuit court decisions. Despite GDF's
refusal to define the regulated object of the ESA as the offending
activity,28I it still uses economic motivation to characterize the takes as
economic?82 The court is therefore looking to the offending activity to
define whether or not the takes are economic. Ironically, GDF arrives at
a similar conclusion as Rancho Viejo and others that believe the ESA is
regulating the offending activity. In addition, by using economic
motivation and economic effects of biodiversity loss as arguments to
characterize the Cave Species takes as economic, the court utilizes the
rationales from both Gibbs and NAHB, respectively.283
VI. CONCLUSION

For the past thirty-three years, the ESA has been providing the basis
for protecting some of the world's most precious and irreplaceable
resources. The reasons for the ESA's existence are the same as they
were thirty-three years ago, and the proponents and critics are pleading
the same arguments they were pleading thirty-three years ago. Though
much has stayed the same, the aspects that have changed signal a dark
future for the ESA and the environmental movement. Though this
Comment contends that the ESA's constitutionality is headed down a
troubled path on its likely journey to the Supreme Court, it also proposes
solutions that would increase the likelihood of the ESA's survival. An
amendment to the ESA, in conjunction with the Supreme Court adopting
the comprehensive scheme rationale from GDF and Raich, would
provide the best short term protections for the future of the ESA.
This Comment intentionally omits possible solutions based solely
on Gibbs' "incubator for commerce" theor/ 84 and NAHB' s "option value

GDF, 326 F.3d at 638·639.
See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
281 GDF, 326 F.3d at 634 (maintaining that, " ... Congress, through the ESA, is not directly
regulating commercial development").
282 [d. at 639.
283 See supra notes 73-79, 81 & 88.
284 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493 (claiming that the red wolves are economic, the court states that
they provide for revenue based on several activities making them "incubators for commerce").
279

280
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nexus,,285 for two reasons. First, in the case of Gibbs, the theory is too
narrow to fully protect species to the extent that the ESA mandates, due
to the inherent requirement that the species generate some sort of
tangible, economic revenue. 286 Second, NAHB's "option value nexus" is
too speculative to survive the Court's heightened rational basis review. 287
The Gibbs court relies heavily on statistical data to support its claim
that red wolves provide a range of commercial enterprises. The court
creates the connection to commerce by finding that the species provides
a basis for 1) tourism, 2) academic study or 3) a presumed market for
goods after the species is no longer endangered. 288 The Gibbs rationale
of using species as "incubators for commerce" was later recognized in
GDF as valid only in those circumstances where supporting data can be
brought forth, as in Gibbs. 289 Some species do not have economic value
in the sense that this reasoning would require, and would therefore not be
covered by this finding. 29o
The NAHB majority's reasoning, that the "option value" of
endangered species creates a link from those species to commerce, is
attenuated and would not survive a heightened rational basis review. The
Court would not find that this nexus is rational based on the easily
dismissed findings from Morrison. 29i
While the concurrence in NAHB makes a strong point in that
extinction as a whole has a real and predictable effect on interstate
commerce by limiting genetic diversity,292 the "option value" of a species
does not provide a certain enough link to commerce. Though many
species provide commercially marketable products, many do not. To
protect all species based on their individual, potential contribution to
commerce is too attenuated.
The Supreme Court could easily dismiss NAHB's option value
nexus as a rational basis even though the rationale is still highly revered
among scholars and scientists?93 A loss of biodiversity could be
devastating for a number of reasons. 294 Many think that cures for thus285 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-1053 (stating that species loss diminishes a potential resource
that could be used for commercial purposes).
286 Gibbs. 214 F.3d at 493.
287 Id. at 490. (recognizing that this is a "rational basis review with teeth").
288 Id. at 492-497.
289 GDF, 326 F.3d at 637.
290 Id. at 638 ("Cave Species takes are neither economic nor commerciaL"). Id.
291 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,614-615.
292 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058-1060.
293 EDWARD WILSON, BIOPHILIA, 121 (1984).
294 T.V.A, 437 U.S. at 178-179 (citing H.R.Rep. No.93-412 at 4-5 (1973) ("From the most
narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interest of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic
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far incurable diseases lurk deep in the rainforests or deserts?95 Some
think that a loss of one species could set off a catastrophic chain of
events that would lead to a drastic imbalance in the ecosystem. 296 The
lure of assigning value to biodiversity through an option value theory
will never disappear from the realm of environmental law. However
appealing the rationale is, that an insect in the middle of the desert might
hold the cure for a debilitating disease, the legal system limits what is
acceptable in the eyes of the Court. In Morrison, the Court held that the
findings regarding the impacts of gender-motivated violence would open
the door to unlimited Congressional power to regulate just about
anything,z97 Just as the findings in Morrison were too attenuated to
survive, the findings here might wither as well at the hands of an even
more conservative Supreme Court. 298 Fortunately, other remedies exist
to protect these species so that we can realize their value in time, and
within the confines of the legal system.
While many had speculated that the ESA might be in trouble, recent
events only confirm such fears. This law review topic was developed
before President Bush appointed John Roberts or Samuel Alito, before
the Supreme Court decided Raich, before Congressman Pombo proposed
a weakening of the ESA, and before the Supreme Court granted certiorari
on the first CWA cases in five years. Many solutions offer valuable
opportunities for the ESA and the future of environmental laws in
general. We can only hope that by the time the next article is written on
this subject, it will speak to the prosperous existence of the ESA and not
its difficult fight for survival.
JENNIFER A. MAIER'

variations. The reason is simple: they are potential resources.")).
295 [d. at 178 ("Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other scourges,
present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much
less analyzed?").
296 [d. at 178-179 ("Congress was concerned about ... the unforeseeable place such creatures
may have in the chain of life on this planet").
297 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-616.
298 [d.
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AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT:

After this Comment was finalized for press in the middle of
February 2006, two wetland cases were argued before the Supreme
Court, which continues to shape the controversy surrounding the ESA's
. .
I'tty. 299
constltutlOna
On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court heard arguments from the
two consolidated wetland jurisdiction cases, Rapanos v. United States
and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, challenging the
applicability of the Clean Water Act. 300 In the transcripts of the Rapanos
and Carabell arguments, Justice Scalia's aggressive questioning and
Chief Justice Roberts' penchant for questioning both sides about the
definitions of such terms as "tributary" and "hydrological connection,"
set the tone of the new Court. 30 ! Although, Justice Souter made a "takehome" point by identifying the weakness in the Petitioner's arguments,
that any polluter could "get away scot-free" if they "dump the pollutant
further-- far enough upstr~am in the watershed.,,302 .
Justice Kennedy, however, may hold the key to unlocking the
mystery as to how applicable these wetlands cases would be to an ESA
case at the Supreme Court level. In the transcript, Justice Kennedy
expresses his concern over stripping states of their rights to govern water
and land resources. 303 Justice Kennedy voted with the majority in
SWANCC, but has voted also with the majority in other cases that were
decided in favor of heavier environmental protection like Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw. 304 This disparity in his opinions demonstrates his prostates rights stance, even in environmental cases. If an ESA case were to
be decided by the current Supreme Court, based on Justice Kennedy's
record and his comments in the Rapanos/Carabell arguments, the ESA

throughout this process and his loving support in both law school and life.
299 See infra note 300.
300 Transcript of Oral Argument. Rapanos v. United States, No. 04-1034 (argued Feb. 21,
2006), 2006 WL 496220; Transcript of Oral Argument, Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
04-1384 (argued Feb. 21, 2006), 2006 WL 496220.
301 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Rapanos & Carabell, 2006 WL 496220 (Nos. 041034 & 04-1384).
302 [d. at 14-15.
303 [d. at 58.
304 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159; Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. !67 (2000); see
generally,
Anthony
Kennedy
on
the
Environment,
ON
THE
ISSUES,
http://www.ontheissues.orglCourtlAnthony_Kennedy_Environment.htm.
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proponent should point out the differences between wetland protections
and the ESA, supra. 305 It is in this way that the argument will appeal to
Justice Kennedy's interest in maintaining state sovereignty.
While this Comment still contends that wetland jurisdiction cases at
the Supreme Court level might indicate how the Court will treat
subsequent ESA cases, the Rapanos and Carabell arguments seem to
sidestep broader constitutional implications, as did the Court in
306
SWANCc.
The Court's narrow questioning pertained mostly to
statutory interpretation of the Clean Water Act, which might lead to a
narrow holding, as in SWANCC. This indicates the Court's reluctance to
deal with the Commerce Clause issue if they are not wholly confronted
with it. Regardless, these cases will have some impact on future ESA
cases and many are anxiously awaiting a Court opinion.
Although these arguments and subsequent judicial theories all
occurred after this Comment was finalized for press, the issue of the
ESA's constitutionality remains undecided. In general, this issue has
been becoming more volatile as development continues to increase and
more and more species become endangered or extinct every day. So
while the Rapanos/Carabell arguments were not able to be included
substantively in this Comment, one would hope that readers will be
inspired to continue to follow this issue and take action when
appropriate.

305
306

See supra notes 171-179.
See supra note 49.
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